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Abstract
Investor Communication and Say-on-Pay
Robert Emerson Bishop
2021
It is well-understood that collective action problems and federal securities law limit
communication among public-company investors. Activist shareholders who wish to hold
corporate insiders to account, however, must rely on support from other investors to effect
change. At the same time, Congress has recently mandated that all public companies give
investors a nonbinding vote on executive pay. Yet few have considered whether such votes
communicate information on investor satisfaction with incumbents to activists. That
consequence—intended or not—could carry significant implications for corporate governance.
In this Article, I show that the federal say-on-pay mandate provides a channel for
institutional investors to communicate openness to an activist engagement. In particular, I exploit
a unique feature of the say-on-pay regulatory regime to show that holding such a vote increases
the odds of future activism. I then test implications of this finding, providing evidence that the
results of those votes predict the likelihood of activism, and that the say-on-pay voting system
facilitates successful outcomes for activists. I conclude that those who favor shareholder voting
as a corporate governance mechanism should carefully consider the effects of such votes on
investor communication when evaluating such policies.
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INVESTOR COMMUNICATION AND SAY-ON-PAY

Robert E. Bishop

Abstract
It is well-understood that collective action problems and federal securities law limit
communication among public-company investors. Activist shareholders who wish to hold
corporate insiders to account, however, must rely on support from other investors to effect
change. At the same time, Congress has recently mandated that all public companies give
investors a nonbinding vote on executive pay. Yet few have considered whether such votes
communicate information on investor satisfaction with incumbents to activists. That
consequence—intended or not—could carry significant implications for corporate governance.
In this Article, I show that the federal say-on-pay mandate provides a channel for institutional
investors to communicate openness to an activist engagement. In particular, I exploit a unique
feature of the say-on-pay regulatory regime to show that holding such a vote increases the odds
of future activism. I then test implications of this finding, providing evidence that the results of
those votes predict the likelihood of activism, and that the say-on-pay voting system facilitates
successful outcomes for activists. I conclude that those who favor shareholder voting as a
corporate governance mechanism should carefully consider the effects of such votes on investor
communication when evaluating such policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, investors at Whole Foods Market cast a surprising vote. Under the Dodd-Frank
Act’s requirement that investors vote on executive pay, investors at Whole Foods had, for years,
consistently voted overwhelmingly to approve the compensation of the company’s top managers.
But in 2017, with the company’s performance lagging, the number of votes cast against
approving executives’ pay suddenly tripled.1 Observers were puzzled: the firm’s top managers
had not received significant pay raises, and its founder had publicly committed years before to
limits on executive pay.2 But two months after the vote, a well-known activist hedge fund named
Jana Partners announced a significant stake in Whole Foods, leading to the replacement of much
of the incumbent board and, eventually, the sale of the company to Amazon. 3 Jana earned a

1

Compare Whole Foods Market, Inc., Form 8-K (Sept. 24, 2015) (documenting that less than 4% of
investors voted against approving executives’ compensation in 2015) with Whole Foods Market, Inc., Form 8-K
(noting that 11% of shares voted against in 2017).
2

John Mackey, Whole Foods’ co-founder and CEO, committed the company to a cap prohibiting any
executive from earning more than nineteen times the salary of the average worker. See John Mackey & Raj Sisodia,
CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013). Whole Foods’ entire executive team
received less than $5 million in total compensation in 2016.
3

See Jana Partners, Schedule 13D (filed March 29, 2017).
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substantial profit,4 having correctly identified investors at Whole Foods—among thousands of
public companies—as sufficiently dissatisfied to support change at the company. Notably, Jana
did this notwithstanding the significant impediments to investor communication imposed by
federal securities law.5
In this Article, I provide evidence of an important—if unintended—consequence of
Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandate: the facilitation of communication between activist hedge
funds and other investors. Since there are few low-cost avenues for such communication, and
activists need support from other shareholders to effect change, say-on-pay votes offer a rare
insight into of investor satisfaction—or dissatisfaction—with management. Exploiting the unique
setting provided by the structure of Dodd-Frank’s voting mandate, I offer evidence that the mere
occurrence of a say-on-pay vote increases the likelihood of the appearance of a hedge-fund
activist. I then test certain implications of this finding. I argue that lawmakers and commentators
now advocating new shareholder-vote mandates should give more careful consideration to the
communication implications of such mandates—and their effect on corporate governance.
The Article begins by documenting how the institutional structure of public-company
ownership and securities law impede communication among public-company investors. Next, I
explain why hedge-fund activists increasingly rely on support from other investors to effect
change. A shareholder-vote mandate, I argue, should be understood in the context of existing law
limiting investors’ ability to communicate about corporate management—a consequence that
lawmakers appear not to have considered when Dodd-Frank became law.

4

Alex Morrell, The Hedge Fund That Turned Whole Foods Into a Takeover Target for Amazon is Walking
Away with $300 Million, BUSINESS INSIDER (2017).
5

For a description of the law and literature explaining how federal law constrains communications among
public-company investors, see infra Part II.A.
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I then provide empirical evidence of the relationship between say-on-pay votes and the
emergence of an activist. First, exploiting the fact that Dodd-Frank requires firms to select the
cadence of say-on-pay votes—a vote must occur at least every one, two, or three years—I show
that the mere occurrence of a vote increases the likelihood of activism. I then test implications of
this finding, providing cross-sectional evidence of the relationship between the proportion of
investors voting against management and future activism. I also provide suggestive evidence that
Dodd-Frank’s enactment of the say-on-pay voting system has improved activist outcomes.
These findings carry important implications for policymakers. Lawmakers advocating
new mandatory shareholder votes on a wide range of matters should take account of the effects
of such mandates on investor communication before making them law. Regulators now
considering changes to federal securities law governing hedge-fund activists, too, should
examine such changes in the context of the evidence presented here.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes how securities law constrains investor
communications, the role of shareholder activism in contemporary corporate governance, and the
adoption of Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandate. Part III provides evidence of shareholder
communication through say-on-pay votes. Part IV discusses policy implications for ongoing
debates over mandated shareholder votes as a mechanism for corporate accountability. Part V
concludes.
II. INVESTOR COMMUNICATION, ACTIVISM, AND SAY-ON-PAY
A long literature has shown that institutional context and securities law significantly
influence the expression of investor preferences. In this Part, I explain how those considerations
inform analysis of the effects of federal intervention in corporate governance.

4

A. Institutional and Legal Constraints on Investor Communication
As Berle and Means famously observed, the separation of ownership and control at
widely held corporations produces agency costs.6 Monitoring management is expensive, and
collective action problems give investors little reason to think that such monitoring is likely to
matter, exacerbating agency problems.7 That would be true even if the institutional structure of
modern public-company ownership, and the law governing those arrangements, did not
discourage shareholders from discovering information and sharing it with fellow investors. But
both do.
As to the former, most public-company shareholders today invest through large
institutional intermediaries like pension funds. At first blush, the institutions’ size offers hope
that they might overcome the collective-action problems individual investors face. But in
practice, as Bernard Black, Jack Coffee and Ed Rock explain, institutional incentives limit the
degree to which they will actively oversee agency problems.8 The institutions face conflicts of
interest, valuing relationships with corporate insiders over holding their feet to the fire, and in
any event often prefer selling a company’s shares over monitoring wayward managers.9

6

ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

7

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983)
(“collective choice problems . . . suggest that [shareholder] voting would rarely have any function except in
extremis”).
8

Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV.
811 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Edward Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).
Black, supra note 8, at 814 (“Many institutional investors depend on corporate managers for business.
They face conflicts of interest if they monitor corporate managers.”); Coffee, supra note 8, at 1330 (“The first and
most obvious problem with institutions as monitors is that they are watchdogs whose every incentive is to flee at the
first sign of trouble.”); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
9

5

Moreover, these institutions increasingly manage index funds: broadly diversified
portfolios for which investments in corporate oversight generate little marginal value. Although
there is some dispute about the degree to which particular institutions make such investments, as
Lucian Bebchuk, John Morley, and Scott Hirst have explained, there is little reason to expect
index funds to invest optimally in corporate monitoring.10
So the institutions that own large public-company stakes have few incentives to monitor
corporate managers. And they have even less reason to share any information they discover
through monitoring with other investors. For one thing, the economics of information acquisition
suggest that investments in monitoring can be justified by informed trading.11 To the degree that
sharing information with others reduces the returns to such trading, there will be little reason for
investors to communicate.
For another, securities law has erected such significant obstacles to investor
communication that the law, in the words of Bernard Black, effectively “foreclose[s] shareholder
ability to form an effective voting coalition.”12 For example, the rules governing shareholder
voting restrict any discussion among investors regarding their voting intentions;13 such

10

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (identifying limitations of index funds’ incentives to engage
in monitoring); John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2019).
11

The canonical model is Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). For an important explanation of the limitations of
that model and implications for securities law, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, (1985).
12

Black, supra note 9 at 531. Like others, Professor Black wonders whether institutional passivity is
inevitable or instead endogenously determined by law. See id. at 530-567 (noting, with characteristic clarity, that
that Article “is long and full of regulatory detail,” but that the “length, however, is part of [his] message”).
13

In response to particularly forceful critiques from commentators, see id; see also Mark J. Roe, . . . Or
Free Speech for Shareholders?, WALL ST. J. (December 18, 1991), the SEC amended these rules to give
shareholders limited leeway in contests in which control is not contested. See SEC Rule 14a-4(d)(4), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-4(d)(4).
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communications usually require preclearance from the Securities and Exchange Commission
itself.14 Similarly, although proposals that shareholders may offer for a vote on the corporate
ballot might facilitate investor communication, federal law has long imposed substantial
limitations on their use.15 (The SEC recently adopted new rules further limiting shareholder
proposals.16)
Federal law imposes even greater costs on larger investors who communicate about
corporate oversight. Significant shareholders who do so risk becoming a “group” for purposes of
rules requiring investors to disclose their intentions regarding corporate control17 as well as
revealing each trade they make in the company’s stock within 48 hours and disgorging so-called
“short-swing profits.”18

14

See Black, supra note 9, at 539-40 (citing Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2018) (asking the
reader, at a rather different time, to “imagine a political campaign where each contestant . . . had to state a long list
of prescribed facts,” “avoid misleading anyone,” and “correct any prior statements which were no longer
accurate.”)).
15

See id. at 541 (noting that the SEC rule governing shareholder proposals, Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2018), bars proposals “in three key areas” critical to monitoring corporate management: “director
nominations,” “statements in opposition to management proposals,” and “alternatives to management proposals”).
16

SEC, Final Rule: Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a8 (Sept. 23, 2020). In dissent, one Commissioner produced data indicating that the new restrictions would result in
the removal of 40% of corporate-governance proposals from the corporate ballot. SEC, Data Appendix to Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr. (Nov. 7, 2019), at 6.
17

The Williams Act, developed in response to tender-offer techniques that imposed pressure on investors,
mandates certain disclosures by investors who own 5% or more of a public company’s shares under Exchange Act
Section 13(d). See Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968); see also Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership
and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 134 (1967) (describing the influence of the testimony of Stanley Kaplan,
Professor, University of Chicago). SEC rules promulgated under the Williams Act extend those mandates to
investors the SEC deems to have agreed to buy, sell, or vote shares in concert—or, in securities-law parlance, to act
as a “group.” SEC, Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1)(2018).
18

Section 16(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act mandates such disclosures for directors, officers, and
10% or greater holders of a public company’s shares, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), and Section 16(b) prescribes the return of
profits from the purchase and then sale of a security within six months, id. § 78p(b). The SEC’s Staff has informed
investors that “[g]roup membership is construed the same way for purposes of Section 16(a) . . . as for purposes of
Section 13(d).” SEC, Exchange Act Section 16 Q&A, Question 110.02 (2009).

7

What’s more, recent developments in federal law raise the specter of even harsher legal
consequences for investor communications. Consider, for example, the law of insider trading,
which punishes both those who provide and those who receive material nonpublic information
that leads to improper trading;19 many now wonder whether once-standard methods of investor
communication raise a risk of criminal liability.20 Or consider recent evidence that institutional
investors have powerful incentives to reduce competition among companies they own. 21 In
response, many have called for investigation of whether these institutions have violated federal
antitrust law.22
To be sure, legal constraints on investor communication may be justified by other policy
priorities. For purposes of this Article, however, examining those justifications is beyond my
scope. Instead, I note only the broad consensus that the institutional structure of ownership and
the law that governs it imposes significant costs on investors who might otherwise communicate
their views about corporate management. In the next section, I consider the influence of those
costs for activist investors.

Whatever one thinks of the emergence of insider-trading prohibitions from securities law’s traditional
antifraud prohibition, see HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), what is clear is that
the contours of criminal liability, particularly for those who give or receive otherwise confidential information, are
sufficiently unclear to give investors pause before communicating their views to others, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281
(2013).
19

Matt Levine, Money Stuff: Insider Trading Isn’t So Simple, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Oct. 15, 2018) (“A lot
of securities analysis [involves techniques that all] focus on getting information that other people don’t have. Are all
of these things fair? I don’t know what ‘fair’ means. Are all of them legal? In insider trading, famously, nobody
quite knows what ‘legal’ means.”).
20

21

See, e.g., Jose Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership,
73 J. FIN. 1 (2018).
22

Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2018).
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B. Shareholder Activism and Investor Communication
Investors seeking to effect change at modern American public companies ordinarily do
not attempt to acquire actual control of the firm.23 Instead, so-called “activist” shareholders
acquire a limited equity stake and then seek to persuade other investors that change is needed. As
Jeffrey Gordon and Ronald Gilson have pointed out, activism in part reflects a response to the
limited incentives of diversified institutional investors to monitor the firms they own.24
“[A]ctivists gain their power not because of their equity stakes, which are not controlling, but
because of their capacity to present convincing plans to institutional shareholders, who
ultimately will decide whether the activists’ proposed plan should be followed.”25
As noted in the previous section, however, securities law imposes significant costs on
communication among investors. For this reason, activists have limited means of understanding
whether a particular firm’s shareholder base is likely to welcome an activist intervention.
That is not to say that activists have no way to assess the likelihood that a potential
target’s shareholders will support an insurgent. Activists can often identify which institutions are

23

One reason, of course, is that Delaware law gives corporate insiders broad legal authority to reject
unfriendly acquirers—notwithstanding strong arguments that the costs of this choice have outweighed its economic
benefits. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 92 (1981) and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982) with Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 103 (1979).
24

There is a lengthy debate about whether activists, on average, enhance firm value. Compare, e.g., Alon
Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) and Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?:
A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L. J. 1870 (2017) and John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism
on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016). That debate is beyond the scope of my Article. For present
purposes, I argue only that, in light of the law governing investor communications, activists value indications of
investor preferences.
25

Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).

9

the largest holders at a particular target company and, based on the institutions’ voting history,
assess the chances that an intervention will have sufficient shareholder support.26 Indeed, recent
empirical work shows that activists choose targets, in part, in light of the makeup of the firm’s
shareholder base.27 Similarly, recent evidence indicates that the outcome of a particular activist
intervention—whether, for example, it results in a proxy contest, a settlement,28 or a desired
operational change—is also related to the firm’s investor base.29
Still, an activist contemplating a costly intervention at a public company can benefit from
knowing more than merely the makeup of the firm’s shareholder base. For one thing, an
institutional investor’s previous votes on activist engagements are unlikely to be perfectly
predictive of how that institution will vote on any particular future engagement. For another,
more recent information on shareholder satisfaction with management may be valuable for
activists concerned with the timing of their intervention.

26

Because securities law requires large investors to disclose their holdings in public companies, an activist
can identify a particular target’s shareholder base at relatively low cost. See Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f); see also SEC Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13 (2018). For an example of market
participants using this information—both to initiate activist campaigns and defend against them—see LAZARD,
FIRST QUARTER 2020 13F FILINGS REPORT (May 2020).
27

See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights:
How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 601) (2020).
28

Settlements with the incumbent board involving the appointment of activist-approved directors are an
increasingly common resolution of activist engagements. Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas
Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2020). In prior work, I examine the effect of such settlements
on information flow from the firm to the market. John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts &
Robert Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 381 (2019).
29

See Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect
of Passive Investors on Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 2720 (2019) (finding that passive investors “mitigate[] freerider problems and facilitates activists’ ability to engage in costly, value-enhancing forms of monitoring”).
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As noted above, federal law has long been understood to make it difficult for investors to
convey, and activists to receive, such a view. But a recent federal intervention in matters of
corporate governance offers a new means of communication among public-company investors.
C. Federal Corporate Governance and Say-on-Pay
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, longstanding critiques of executive pay at public
companies attracted policymakers’ attention.30 Claims that taxpayer-funded bailouts were used to
finance banker bonuses, in particular, moved the Obama Administration to include executivecompensation reforms in the post-crisis financial regulation proposal that became law as the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.31
Policymakers were particularly concerned that public-company directors lacked sufficient
incentives to bargain at arms’ length with executives over compensation.32 Thus, Dodd-Frank
included a federal mandate requiring nearly every U.S. public company to hold a nonbinding
vote on executive pay.33

30

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002), and LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004), offer the classic
case for why public-company directors may fail to bargain at arms’ length with executives over compensation.
31

See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Crazy Compensation and the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2009) (capturing
the then-prevailing sentiment over executive compensation). In the midst of the political frenzy over executive pay,
the Obama Treasury went so far as to create a specialized Office empowered to disapprove compensation at certain
firms that were the beneficiaries of federal bailouts. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL MASTER FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, FINAL REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER KENNETH R. FEINBERG
(Sept. 10, 2010).
32

For the canonical judicial debate, compare Jones v. Harris Assoc., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[E]conomic analysis [of executive-pay bargains] is ripe for
reexamination on the basis of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms is
excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation”) with Jones v. Harris
Assoc., 527 F.3d 627 (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“Competitive processes are imperfect but remain superior to a ‘just price’
system administered by the judiciary.”).
33

The statute borrowed from the experience of the United Kingdom, which has mandated such votes since
2002, see DIRECTORS REMUNERATION REPORT REGULATIONS 2002. Analysis of the desirability of this
development—or whether it reflects what has sometimes been referred to as “quack” federalization of corporate
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Recognizing that mandating such a vote every year would be costly, however, Congress
included a provision unique among the federal securities laws.34 Rather than mandating annual
votes, the statute permits shareholders to choose the frequency of say-on-pay votes at their
firm.35 Specifically, investors may choose between holding such a vote annually, every two
years, or every three years. A shareholder vote on that choice—a “say-on-frequency” vote—must
occur once at least every six years.36
In the nine years since the SEC implemented this statute,37 an extensive literature has
developed examining its effects on executive pay. Some studies find little evidence that

governance—is beyond the scope of this Article. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). But to the degree that lawmakers were motivated by
concerns that banker pay before the financial crisis produced incentives for excessive risk-taking, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY, supra note 31, it is worth noting that increasing shareholder influence over executive-pay
bargains is unlikely to solve that problem. The reason is that shareholders and bankers are united in their interest in
internalizing profits from excessive risk-taking if the costs of such risk-taking can be shared with the government
through an ex post bailout. Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010).
To the degree that banker pay creates an economic problem, that problem is properly understood as one of moral
hazard. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2010).
Increasing shareholder power over compensation bargains, by contrast, is a potential solution for agency problems.
34

Notwithstanding extensive commentary on the subject, federal securities law, in contrast with state
corporate law, has generally not embraced default rules of this type. For an analysis of the optimal structure of
default rules related to the balance of power between shareholders and management, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010).
35

See Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203 (July 21, 2010) (adding new Section 14A(a) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
See id. at Section 951(a)(2) (“Not less frequently than once every 6 years, a proxy or consent or
authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the
Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to a shareholder vote to
determine whether [the say-on-pay vote] will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.”).
36

37

See SEC, Final Rule: Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, Release Nos. 33-9178, 34-63768, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011) (adopting the relevant rules in
January 2011 and requiring most companies to begin holding votes at the first annual shareholders’ meeting
occurring on or after January 21, 2011). The rule allowed smaller reporting companies to begin say-on-pay votes at
the first annual meeting occurring after January 21, 2013. See id.

12

compensation plans respond to the results of say-on-pay votes.38 Others offer evidence that firms
that receive weak support in say-on-pay votes, and those firms’ peers, make marginal
adjustments to compensation packages.39 And Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and Darius
Palia have provided important evidence that say-on-pay votes may reflect investor responses to
firm-specific performance rather than the details of pay packages.40
To my knowledge, however, no prior academic work has examined the possibility that
say-on-pay votes offer a rare mechanism for activists to gauge shareholder receptiveness to an
activist intervention.41 One reason may be that, at the time Dodd-Frank became law, no
policymaker suggested that the statute was intended to help activist hedge funds understand
investor preferences.42 But given the literature documenting how federal law constrains investor
communication, and the increasing importance of activists’ understanding of institutional
38

Chris Armstrong, Ian Gow & David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from
Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCTNG. RSCH. 909 (2013). What’s more, important recent work identifies
negative stock-price reactions when firms alter their compensation programs following the introduction of say-onpay. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory
Firms, 58 J. L. & ECON. 173 (2015).
39

Diane K. Denis, Torsten Jochem & Anjana Rajamani, Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation:
The Peer Effects of Say on Pay, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 3130 (2019). For an exceptionally helpful review of the
extensive literature on say-on-pay votes, see Fabrizio Ferri & Robert F. Gox, Executive Compensation, Corporate
Governance and Say on Pay, 12 FOUND. TRENDS IN ACCTNG. 1 (2018).
40

Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Darius Palia, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018) (providing, to my knowledge, the sole academic commentary to the
effect that “granting shareholders [the say-on-pay] forum [to the degree it is used largely to] signal[] their
dissatisfaction with the firm’s economic performance may be counterproductive”).
41

At least one journalist, however, recently identified this possibility, apparently through discussions with
finance professionals. See Ronald Orol, Negative Say-on-Pay Votes Signal “Blood in the Water” For Activists, THE
DEAL (July 14, 2020).
42

Indeed, many lawmakers who supported Dodd-Frank in general, and the say-on-pay provision in
particular, have since expressed deep skepticism about the role of activist investors in contemporary capital markets.
Compare, e.g., Sen. Jeff Merkley & Sen. Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 515 (2011) (describing Sen.
Merkley’s support for Dodd-Frank) with Liz Moyer, Two Senate Democrats Introduce Bill to Curb Activist Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (March 17, 2016) (describing the Senator’s support for a bill to prevent activists
from “enrich[ing] themselves at the expense of workers, taxpayers, and communities”).
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investors’ views, that possibility seems a plausible, if unintended, consequence of the statute. In
the next section, I consider that possibility in more detail.
D. Activism, Investor Communication, and Say-on-Pay Votes
In this section, I consider the possibility that Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay statute provides a
mechanism through which activists detect investors’ willingness to support an intervention from
an insurgent shareholder. In particular, I explain why—although other means of communicating
investor preferences are theoretically available—say-on-pay votes may, in practice, be an
especially appealing mechanism for investor communication.
To begin, as noted above an activist today is unlikely to obtain a sufficient stake in a
public company to take control.43 Instead, activists must rely on support from other shareholders
to pursue their plans—or, if incumbents refuse to engage, an eventual proxy fight. It is wellunderstood that activists target underperforming firms owned by institutional investors that have
previously supported activism.44 But such targeting cannot assure the activist ex ante that the
costs of an engagement will be justified after the fact with sufficient shareholder support.
In theory, one can imagine at least three ways that an activist could obtain that assurance.
First, the activist could obtain contractual commitments from institutional investors
regarding how they will vote on the activist’s plans. As noted above, however, in practice federal
securities law makes such an agreement exceptionally, and often prohibitively, costly. An
agreement of this type could, among other things, require SEC preclearance to ensure
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25. Among other legal interventions that limit an activist’s ability to
obtain a larger stake, the Williams Act requires disclosure of activist positions above 5% of a public company’s
outstanding shares and Delaware law is increasingly solicitous of low-trigger poison pills that stop activist
accumulations at thresholds of 10%. Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 59 (2012) (“The United States is the only country in which
incumbents can use shareholder rights plans to impose a ceiling on the size of the stakes that can be purchased by
outside blockholders.”).
43

See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 27 (“We find evidence of a positive selection effect: dissidents are more
likely to initiate contests and proceed to voting when shareholders are expected to be more supportive.”).
44
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compliance with the proxy solicitation rules,45 require disclosure of the investors’ agreement
under the Williams Act, trigger obligations to disclose subsequent trades within two days and to
return all short-swing profits under Section 16, and may even trigger the target company’s
takeover defenses.46
Second, the activist could simply seek private signs from investors regarding their
willingness to support the activist’s campaign. But even private, informal communication of an
institutional investor’s voting intentions can implicate the SEC’s proxy rules.47 While informal
discussions of this kind may not require disclosure under the Williams Act, increasingly publiccompany takeover defenses include provisions that might be triggered by such discussions.48
And perhaps most forebodingly for an investor, confidential discussions of this kind may also
raise concerns about insider-trading liability.49
Finally, activists could simply observe other public indicators of shareholder satisfaction,
such as votes on director elections or investor proposals. But these alternatives, too, have
limitations. Votes on director elections are, unlike say-on-pay votes, binding: an institution

45

17 CFR 240.14a-1(l)(iii).

46

Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 43 (documenting the increasing incidence of low-trigger poison pills
directed at activist investors).
47

See, e.g., David K. Robbins, Stephen D. Alexander & Janice A. Liu, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Email
Correspondence May Be Considered Proxy Soliciting Material (May 7, 2009) (warning clients that “informal…email correspondence…instant messaging, twittering and other electronic forms of equally informal communication
[may] be viewed [as proxy solicitation material] and require same day filing”).
48

Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 43; see also Genesco Inc. Second Amended and Restated Rights
Agreement (Form 8-K), at 6-7 (Apr. 9, 2010) (providing a real-world example of a poison pill triggered by those
“acting in concert,” even informally). While there is some question about the legality of takeover defenses of this
kind, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, 99 B.U. L. REV. 915, 964 (2019), even the prospect
of litigating that question—and risking the consequences of triggering a poison pill—itself may impose sufficient
costs to dissuade activists from pursuing this path.
49

See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, Comment Letter on Amendments to Exemptions from the
Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice (Jan. 31, 2020) (noting, in a different context, that such a “vote
recommendation might constitute material, nonpublic information”).
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voting against a director risks unseating her or compromising the relationship between the
institution and the board.50 And shareholder proposals are rarely directed toward the performance
of incumbent management. Instead, the evidence shows that such proposals are overwhelmingly
sponsored by so-called “gadfly” investors and emphasize one-size-fits-all ideas related to
environmental, social, or governance changes.51 Shareholder votes on such proposals may not
provide activists with a reliable indication of investor satisfaction with incumbent management.
By contrast, nonbinding votes on executive pay offer an attractive, low-cost mechanism
for institutions seeking to communicate views toward incumbent management. For one thing, the
vote is nonbinding; the practical consequences of a significant negative vote are relatively minor.
For another, unlike shareholder proposals—which arrive at a selected set of firms—say-on-pay
votes are held regularly across all public companies. The text of the actual proposal subject to the
vote is mandated by SEC rules and so is consistent across firms.52 And the proposal’s text
directly speaks to investors’ views about incumbent managers, rather than general
environmental, social, or governance questions.
To be sure, activists and the institutional investors whose support they seek have a range
of mechanisms for engaging in such communication. But there is reason to expect—although
lawmakers and commentators appear not to have contemplated this consequence—that DoddFrank’s say-on-pay mandate provides one such mechanism. In the next Part, I provide the first

50

Institutional investors have strong incentives to maintain their relationship with corporate managers. See,
e.g., Black, supra note 8.
51

See SEC, Data Appendix to Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr., supra note 16,
at 1 (citing Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy:
Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism, forthcoming, REV. FIN. STUD. (2021)).
The SEC instructs that the “resolution shall indicate that the shareholder advisory vote under this
subsection is to approve the compensation of the registrant’s named executive officers.” SEC Rule 14a-21(a), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a).
52
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evidence that activist investors use say-on-pay votes as a sign of investors’ openness to a future
activist intervention.
III. EVIDENCE ON SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATION AND SAY-ON-PAY
In this Part, I provide evidence that activist shareholders use say-on-pay votes to gauge
investors’ sentiment towards incumbent management. I begin by describing my dataset and the
structure of Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandate, which allows firms to choose the frequency with
which say-on-pay votes are held. I exploit this unique feature to study the effects of such votes
on future activism. I then show cross-sectionally that the results of these votes predict future
activism. Finally, I offer suggestive evidence that that the introduction of the say-on-pay voting
regime in Dodd-Frank corresponds with an increase in successful outcomes for activists.
A. Data
I begin by drawing data on say-on-pay votes from Institutional Shareholder Services
Voting Analytics, including the dates of such votes, the frequencies at which each firm holds the
vote, and the vote results.53 My empirical design exploits the fact that firms may choose to hold a
say-on-pay vote every one, two, or three years. Table 1 below summarizes the frequency choices
U.S. public companies have made under that law:
Frequency of
Say-on-Pay
Votes
Annually

Percentage of
Firms
86.1%

Once Every
0.9%
Two Years
Once Every
13.0%
Three Years
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: FREQUENCY OF SAY-ON-PAY VOTES54

53

See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES VOTING ANALYTICS DATABASE (2020). I provide additional
detail on the assembly of my dataset in the Appendix.
54

Specifically, this table shows the proportions of voting frequency regimes at the time each vote was held
throughout the sample.
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As Table 1 shows, the overwhelming majority of firms elect to hold a say-on-pay vote
annually.55 But a meaningful proportion of public companies have opted to hold the votes at the
two- or three-year cadence permitted by Dodd-Frank.
As to the results of such votes, Table 2 below presents summary statistics on say-on-pay
vote outcomes, calculated as the percentage of outstanding shares voted For, Against, and
Abstain:56
Percentile
Vote For
Vote Against
Abstain
10th
40.1%
0.5%
0.04%
25th
55.9%
1.2%
0.12%
50th
70.6%
2.7%
0.34%
75th
80.5%
6.2%
0.87%
90th
86.5%
16.7%
2.24%
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS: SAY-ON-PAY VOTING OUTCOMES, BY PERCENTILE

As Table 2 shows, the overwhelming majority of investors generally vote in favor in sayon-pay votes. Nevertheless, although Against votes are generally rare, further out in the
distribution a substantial proportion of investors cast votes Against approving executives’ pay.
I supplement these data with information on activist hedge fund interventions, including
the announcement date of activist campaigns and the results of each campaign, from the
SharkRepellent database.57 And since activist behavior depends on a wide range of factors, and
because I seek to isolate the effects of say-on-pay votes, I identify from the literature a wide

55

The summary data in Table 1 are consistent with previous empirical work analyzing the results of sayon-frequency votes at U.S. public companies. Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Investors:
Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay, 33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 1337 (2016)
(examining the influence of management recommendations on the outcome of say-on-frequency votes).
56

To calculate the values in Table 2, I first sorted the For vote from high to low and computed the firmlevel percentiles displayed. I then repeated the same process for the Against vote, and then for the Abstain vote.
57
See SHARKREPELLENT.NET (last accessed January 2, 2021).
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range of covariates known to be linked to activism and merge those variables with into my
dataset.58
B. Setting
As noted above, Dodd Frank’s say-on-pay mandate includes a unique provision allowing
investors to choose how often say-on-pay votes occur. Specifically, the statute allows for the
vote to be held every one, two, or three years. In this section, I explain that this choice, once
made, is sticky: that is, it is costly to change, and thus changed exceptionally rarely. For that
reason, the choice offers a plausibly exogenous setting in which to evaluate whether the
occurrence of a say-on-pay vote increases the likelihood of activism.59
When Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, the SEC required firms to choose in 2011 whether
to hold say-on-pay votes every one, two, or three years. But under SEC rules, once a public
company has chosen a particular frequency, say-on-pay votes must be held at that cadence unless
management proposes, and shareholders vote to approve, a different frequency. 60 So changing

58

In particular, I draw quarterly accounting-level data for all publicly traded firms from Compustat,
complementing firm-level data with CRSP detail on stock prices and information on sell-side analysts who follow
each stock, assembling the suite of covariates from the literature, see Appel et al., supra note 29; see also WHARTON
RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, COMPUSTAT AND CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SECURITY PRICES DATASETS (2020).
Following Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. TRENDS IN FIN. 1
(2010), I include the log of the firm’s market capitalization, sales growth, return on assets, leverage, dividend yield,
research and development, the standard measure of liquidity (see Yakhov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock Returns:
Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects, 5 J. FIN. MKTS. 31 (2002)), and the number of analysts covering the stock.
Consistent with the previous literature, see id., I also include Tobin’s Q, notwithstanding its limitations, see Robert
Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353 (2020). I also compute the level of
institutional ownership at each firm, from which I additionally calculate the firm-level proportion of passive
investors using the methods described in Appel et al., supra note 29. Finally, I winsorize these covariates at the 1%
level to mitigate the effects of outliers. Further detail is provided in the Appendix.
59

My approach employs a similar method to that used in important recent work by Emiliano Catan
exploiting firms’ sticky responses to a new voting policy adopted by Institutional Shareholder Services. See
Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2019).
60

See SEC, Final Rule: Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, supra note 37, at 29 (imposing additional disclosure requirements for issuers seeking to change the
frequency of the say-on-pay vote). While as a formal matter the outcome of the shareholder vote on frequency is not
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the timing of say-on-pay votes is costly, requiring management to obtain separate shareholder
approval.61
As a result, changes in the frequency with which public companies hold say-on-pay votes
are, empirically, exceptionally rare. Of the 23,560 firm-years with a say-on-pay vote in my
dataset, only 303, or 1.3%, involve switches of say-on-pay frequency. Even more rare is a firm
that lengthens the frequency at which a say-on-pay vote must occur (that is, changing from
voting annually to voting every three years). Of the 5,334 unique firms in my sample, only 37, or
0.7%, have reduced the frequency of say-on-pay voting.
Thus, at firms where say-on-pay votes are not held annually, the timing of such votes is
plausibly exogenous to factors like the firm’s performance. Put another way, at these firms the
government has imposed a requirement that investors speak their minds at times that are quasirandomly selected. Because switching the timing of the vote is costly, managers and activists
alike must take the vote when it comes, rather than at the moment they might choose on the basis
of factors endogenous to the appearance of an activist. Given that unique setting, in this Article I
consider whether activists are more likely to strike after shareholders speak through this channel.
C. Results
In this section, I provide the first evidence that say-on-pay votes convey information to
activist investors contemplating an intervention at U.S. public companies. Exploiting the unique

binding on the board of directors, see, e.g., id. at 5, I am unaware of any case in which a board has chosen to hold
say-on-pay votes at a different frequency than that approved by investors.
61

If this were not the case, one might be concerned that a manager anticipating shareholder activism—or
one of its determinants, such as poor performance—could select the timing of votes to reduce the likelihood of an
activist attack. And although managers cannot see infinitely far into the future, one might be concerned that insiders
will switch frequencies upon learning that an activist may be on the horizon. If either were true, this setting could
not usefully identify a causal relationship between the existence of a say-on-pay vote and activism. But, for the
reasons given in the text, the unique legal context of Dodd-Frank mitigates that concern, requiring firms to select the
frequency of the vote far in advance and imposing costs on changing it. Hence, there is reason to think that the
timing of the vote is uncorrelated with the other predictors of activism, such as poor firm-level performance.
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setting in which say-on-pay votes occur—that is, at a frequency that firms choose in advance and
is costly to change—I show that the occurrence of a periodic say-on-pay vote increases the
likelihood of future activism. I then test implications of this finding, providing evidence that the
results of the votes themselves cross-sectionally predict the likelihood of activism. Finally, I
offer suggestive evidence of an increased probability of successful activist engagements
following the enactment of the say-on-pay voting regime.
1. Say-on-Pay Votes and Activism. I begin by analyzing whether the occurrence of a
periodic say-on-pay vote in a given year leads to an increased probability of activism in the
subsequent year. To do so, I limit my sample to only those firms holding say-on-pay votes every
two or three years.62 I then code Voten,t as equal to 1 if company n has held a say-on-pay vote in
the year preceding time t, and 0 otherwise, and Activismn,t as a dummy variable equal to 1 if an
activist targeted company n during time t and 0 otherwise. Then I code Placebon,t which, during
the decade preceding Dodd-Frank, is equal to 1 if extending the say-on-pay voting regime
backwards in time for company n at its chosen frequency would mark time t as a “voting” year,
and 0 otherwise.63
I then use an event study approach to test whether the occurrence of a vote predicts future
activism. To do so, for the years after Dodd-Frank, I compare the average probability of an
activist intervention in the year preceding a say-on-pay-vote, the year immediately following

62

Because my identification strategy relies on a subset of public companies, there is reason to wonder
whether the results described here are generalizable outside this sample. I explore this issue further in Section
III.C.2; for present purposes, I note that some 14% of U.S. public companies hold a say-on-pay vote every two or
three years, a sizeable set of companies, and that limitations like these are not uncommon in empirical literature in
this area. See, e.g., GUIDO W. IMBENS & JOSHUA D. ANGRIST, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS (2008).
63

For example, if a firm holds say-on-pay votes once every three years and a vote preceded the second
quarter of 2011, for that firm I code that a placebo vote preceded the second quarter of 2008, the second quarter of
2005, and the second quarter of 2002 for purposes of the analysis described in Figure 1.
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such a vote, and the subsequent year, and, for years before Dodd-Frank, in years preceding,
immediately following, and subsequent to a placebo “vote.” Figure 1 provides the results:
Pre-Dodd Frank

Post-Dodd Frank

FIGURE 1. PROBABILITY OF ACTIVIST TARGETING
BY VOTING (OR PLACEBO) OCCURRENCES

As Figure 1 shows, before Dodd-Frank, there was no meaningful difference in the
probability of activism in years immediately following a “placebo” say-on-pay vote and in those
either before or after such a “vote.”64 But after Dodd-Frank, the probability of an activist
intervention was statistically significantly greater in years immediately following a periodic sayon-pay vote than in years preceding the vote or in subsequent years.
One reaction to Figure 1 might be to wonder about the economic significance of the
change documented here; two responses warrant mentioning. First, a firm was approximately
36% more likely to be attacked by an activist in a quarter following a vote than in one not

64

The vertical lines for each bar in Figure 1 display 95% confidence intervals for the average likelihood of
activism for each group. As Figure 1 shows, before Dodd-Frank there is no statistically meaningful difference
between the probability of activism immediately following a placebo “vote” and in preceding or subsequent years.
By contrast, however, Figure 1 makes clear that after Dodd-Frank the emergence of an activist is statistically
significantly different in years immediately following a say-on-pay vote than in years preceding the vote or
subsequent years.
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preceded by a vote—a meaningful jump in magnitude.65 Second, as the literature points, out a
significant proportion of the effects of activism arise from changes to management’s ex ante
behavior in light of the possibility that activists might intervene, so that even seemingly small
changes in observed activist behavior can have substantial real-world effects.66
I further explore this result by estimating the following linear probability model:

Because the occurrence of a voting year is plausibly exogenous, concerns about
comparisons between voting and non-voting years may be limited. But for completeness I
include two different methods in order to mitigate concerns that the results are driven by
improper comparisons between voting and non-voting years. First, I run the model using firmfixed effects to control for any within-firm variation post Dodd-Frank in say-on-pay years. Next,
I also employ a propensity score matching process. In particular, I match firm-quarters based on
firm size, performance, industry, within three-year periods over the sample, in order to help
ensure that the voting and non-voting periods being compared are as comparable as possible, and
to help mitigate concerns related to time trends in the data.67
I first run these tests on the sample after the enactment of say-on-pay. Table 3 below
presents the regression results, where model (1) reflects the analysis without matching or firmfixed effects, model (2) uses firm-fixed effects, and model (3) uses the matched sample:

65

Across the full set of public companies in the United States, the baseline probability of an activist attack
in a given quarter after the passage of Dodd-Frank was approximately 1.6%, so an increase in magnitude of roughly
0.5% is arguably meaningful in that context.
66

See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil, and Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance Under the Gun:
Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 23 REV. FIN. 6 (2019).
67

In the Appendix, I give further detail on the propensity matching process, and also provide a balance test
and a kernel density plot to show that the propensity score matching process created balanced groups.
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Activism
During
Quarter
(1)
0.0053***
(0.0019)

Activism
During
Quarter
(2)
0.0051***
(0.0019)

Activism
During
Quarter
(3)
0.0048**
(0.0023)

Dummy for Sayon-Pay Vote
During Preceding
Year
Firm-Fixed Effects
No
Yes
No
Matching
No
No
Yes
Observations
23,105
23,105
15,138
TABLE 3. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AND ACTIVISM

Table 3 shows a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of activism during a
quarter that follows a vote.68 This difference exists, and holds steady at comparable magnitudes,
for the specifications using firm-fixed effects and for the matched sample as well.
As an additional check, I run the same tests on the decade preceding Dodd Frank using
the Placebo variable in place of a Vote. Table 4 describes the results:
Activism
During
Quarter
(1)
0.0007
(0.0011)

Activism
During
Quarter
(2)
0.0008
(0.0011)

Dummy for Sayon-Pay Vote
During Preceding
Year
Firm-Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Matching
No
No
Observations
21,822
21,819
TABLE 4. PLACEBO VOTE AND ACTIVISM

Activism
During
Quarter
(3)
0.0008
(0.0018)

No
Yes
10,691

As expected, Table 4 shows no results of our placebo on the likelihood of activism in the
time before the enactment of say-on-pay. This helps address the possibility that these findings
are driven by a secular trend over time.69

68

I use the following indicators of statistical significance throughout: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p
< 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. I cluster standard errors at the firm level.
69

I acknowledge that, in the years following the passage of Dodd-Frank, we observe an increasing time
trend in the total incidence of activism. However, to the degree that a say-on-pay vote being held in a given year is
plausibly exogenous, this evidence reflects not a general time trend, but an effect with a cadence that matches the
cadence of the say-on-pay vote.
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To the degree that the choice of the cadence of say-on-pay votes is plausibly exogenous,
Figure 1, and Tables 3 and 4, provide evidence that the occurrence of a say-on-pay vote has
facilitated activism since Dodd-Frank became law. In the sections that follow, I consider the
degree to which the outcome of that vote—that is, the expression of shareholders’ views—
predicts activism.
2. Vote outcomes and activism. In this section, I consider two potential implications of a
causal relationship between a say-on-pay vote and an activist intervention.70 First, I examine
whether activists might gain information from the contents of the votes themselves. I also assess
whether activists have more efficiently targeted firms for intervention in the years since DoddFrank, and its say-on-pay mandate, became law.
a. Say-on-pay votes as a predictor of activism. If say-on-pay votes offer activists
meaningful information on shareholder sentiment, one would expect the outcomes of those votes
to be related to the probability of future activism. I test that possibility here.
I begin by considering the full set of say-on-pay votes, including firms that hold such
votes annually, every two years, every three years. I then compute the outcomes of each firm’s
say-on-pay votes. I use the Against vote as a potential sign of investor dissatisfaction with

70

To be clear, I make no claim of causality related to this additional evidence. Instead, in light of the
plausible evidence of a causal relationship between the occurrence of say-on-pay votes and activism presented
supra, here I offer additional evidence that is consistent with that possibility.
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incumbent management,71 because such a vote requires investors to take an affirmative step:
voting against a proposal that usually draws significant support.72
I then use a cross-sectional model to examine the predictive power of say-on-pay vote
outcomes on the probability of a future activist intervention at a given firm.73 For these tests, I
estimate the following linear probability model:

where Againstn,t is the percentage of outstanding shares voted Against in the say-on-pay vote at
company n at time t, ActivismAftern,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an activist targeted
company n during the year immediately following the Against vote held at time t and 0
otherwise, Xn,t is a vector of company-level covariates, and εn,t is the error term.
Because I am interested in the marginal predictive power of the say-on-pay vote outcome
on whether an activist intervenes, the choice of control variables is especially important in this
specification. Fortunately, a robust literature establishes the known determinants of hedge fund
activism. Borrowing from that literature, I include a wide range of observables known to be

71

As explained above, see supra at tbl.2, there is considerable variation in the level of the For vote, making
it a relatively noisy gauge; because retail investors frequently fail to vote in matters such as say-on-pay, For votes
may be different at two firms with otherwise similar levels of investor support for management if one of those firms
has a meaningfully higher level of retail holders, complicating interpretation of the results. Institutional investors
vote Abstain sufficiently rarely in this context that I focus on Against as a proxy of openness to an activist
campaign.
72

Although Against votes are generally rare in say-on-pay proposals, see supra at tbl.2, a meaningful
number of shareholders vote Against say-on-pay proposals further out in the distribution. While at first blush the
proportion of Against votes may seem trivial—even firms in the 90th percentile of Against votes have just 16.7% of
votes cast Against—this degree of shareholder dissatisfaction may offer meaningful information to an activist
contemplating a costly intervention. This view is consistent with regulatory analysis and academic literature arguing
that, in light of public-company investors’ well-understood rational apathy, even small proportions of shareholder
votes may reflect meaningful information about investor sentiment. See, e.g., SEC, Final Rule: Executive
Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,582 & n.8 (July 2, 1992) (justifying rules requiring disclosure of
executive pay in part because shareholder proposals on that subject drew support of more than 10%).
73

While I use a linear regression model here for ease of interpretation, I include a probit model in the
Appendix for completeness, which provides similar results.
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determinants of activism as controls in this specification.74 Table 5 below summarizes the
regression results, where model (1) reflects a simpler cross-sectional analysis and model (2)
includes the full set of controls:
Dummy for
Dummy for
Activist in
Activist in Next
Next Year
Year
(1)
(2)
Proportion of Votes
0.2488***
0.2269***
Against on Say-on-Pay
(0.0299)
(0.0344)
Controls?
No
Yes
Observations
20,486
16,134
TABLE 5. PREDICTIVE POWER OF SAY-ON-PAY VOTES ON FUTURE ACTIVISM

As Table 5 shows, there is a powerful link between the proportion of shareholders voting
Against say-on-pay and the probability that an activist will intervene at the firm over the
following year.75 Indeed, even without controls, a one percentage point increase in Against votes
predicts a 0.25% increase in activism.76 That link is robust at 1% statistical significance on its
own, as well as after including controls for known determinants of activism—and, importantly,
the economic and statistical significance of that relationship is stable to a wide range of different
specifications.77
Of course, one concern with the models described in Table 5 is the degree to which
results may be driven by outliers. To address those concerns and provide a visualization of the

74

In addition to the variables described supra at note 59, borrowing from Appel et al., supra note 29, I also
identify the degree of passive ownership for each firm to mitigate concerns that cross-sectional results are driven by
differences in that shareholder base.
75

In the Appendix, I document time trends in the magnitude of the relationship between the Against vote
and future activism that are consistent with the possibility that activists learn to rely on the outcome of the vote.
76
See Section II.C.1, supra, for a discussion of the possible economic significance of coefficients of this
magnitude.
77

In particular, including the additional covariates does not substantially change the magnitude of the
relationship between the Against vote and future activism, nor does it take away meaningfully from its statistical
significance.
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relationship documented in Table 5, Figure 2 divides the Against vote into deciles and graphs the
average probability of future activism within each bin:

FIGURE 2. PROBABILITY OF ACTIVIST TARGETING
BY DECILE OF VOTES AGAINST SAY-ON-PAY78

Figure 2 documents a monotonic relationship between the Against vote on say-on-pay
and the probability that a firm will experience an activist intervention in the year immediately
following the vote. That is: as the proportion of shareholders casting an Against vote on say-onpay rises, the likelihood of an activist intervention similarly rises. That relationship has intuitive
appeal: as the proportion of investors expressing dissatisfaction with incumbents rises, the
likelihood that an activist will have sufficient shareholder support for an intervention also rises.
Put another way, an activist contemplating a costly public-company engagement may be more
likely to pursue that path in the presence of a sign that those investments will be rewarded with
shareholder support.
To be sure, the simple correlation between Against votes and the probability of activism
does not establish a causal relationship between say-on-pay votes and activist interventions.79

78

To create Figure 2, I first grouped say-on-pay votes into ten buckets based on the proportion of
shareholders voting Against say-on-pay at each firm in a given year. I then computed the average probability of
activist targeting in the following year for all of the firm-years within each bucket. Although more extensive
regression analysis is available in the Appendix, many observers may prefer a simple graphical description of the
distribution. I thank my doctoral advisor Jake Thomas, and committee members Shyam Sunder and Frank Zhang,
for their advice in creating Figure 2.
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But the evidence is consistent with the possibility that activists examine the informational
content of the say-on-pay vote when selecting public companies to target.
b. Evidence on activist efficiency. Another implication of the possibility that say-on-pay
votes provide valuable information to activists is that the existence of those votes should improve
activists’ efficiency in choosing targets. That is: activists should achieve their desired outcomes
at higher rates in a world with say-on-pay votes than without, because information gained by
observing the voting process should help guide activists to engagements where activists have
more investor support—and, hence, are more likely to yield those outcomes.
To test that possibility, I assemble additional data related to the results of activist
engagements over time. As noted above, in connection with such engagements activists
ordinarily seek representation on the company’s board.80 Although this is not the only result
activists might pursue in a particular engagement, access to the corporate boardroom can be an
especially valuable outcome for an activist.81 Thus, I compute the probability by year, both
before and after the passage of Dodd-Frank, that an activist engagement results in board
representation.82 Figure 3 below describes the results:

79

While the addition of the Against vote provides incremental predictive power to the existing models for
predicting hedge fund activism in the literature, this does not establish a causal relationship between the outcome of
the say-on-pay vote and activism.
See, e.g., Bebchuk et. al, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that “[a]n important milestone often reached in the
life of an activist engagement is entering into a ‘settlement’ agreement between the activist and the target’s board,”
pursuant to which the activist’s chosen representatives are elected to the board).
80

81

In previous work with Jack Coffee, Robert Jackson, and Joshua Mitts, I examine potential costs related to
such settlements, including the possibility that an activist’s position on the board affects the transmission of
information from the boardroom to the stock market. See Coffee et al., supra note 28.
82

Computing the probability that an activist engagement results in a settlement agreement produces similar

results.
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FIGURE 3. PROBABILITY THAT ACTIVIST ENGAGEMENTS RESULT IN
BOARD REPRESENTATION, OVER TIME

As Figure 3 shows, activist hedge funds have had considerably more success in obtaining
board representation in the years since say-on-pay votes have been required by law.83 Of course,
Figure 3 cannot and does not isolate the effects of say-on-pay votes from other trends that may
have occurred simultaneously, including trends in the outcomes of activist engagements over
time. But Figure 3 is consistent with the possibility that say-on-pay votes have improved the
efficiency of hedge-fund activism.
In sum, although lawmakers appear to have given little consideration to this possibility,
there is strong evidence that the say-on-pay votes mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act now provide
activist hedge funds with a powerful sign of investors’ openness to a dissident’s intervention.84
In the next Part, I consider implications of these findings for lawmakers and commentators
concerned about corporate governance.

83

As noted above, although the Dodd-Frank Act became law in 2010, SEC rules mandating the say-on-pay
and say-on-frequency votes did not take effect until annual meetings occurring in 2011. SEC, Final Rule:
Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, supra note 37, at 1.
84

Of course, one may wonder whether public identification of this result will affect future investor
behavior. For instance, shareholders who have not previously used the say-on-pay vote in this fashion may begin to
do so. Or management may attempt to minimize dissent in say-on-pay votes in light of the risk that such dissent may
draw activist attention. I intend to study the possibility of such effects in future work.
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My findings offer insights for professors, practitioners, and policymakers concerned
about the balance of power between corporate managers and public-company investors. In
particular, those weighing proposals to increase shareholder influence through voting mandates
should consider the implications of possibly creating new and unanticipated channels for
investors communication before adopting new rules. And recent debates on the regulation of
hedge fund activists under federal securities law should also take account the communication
facilitated by Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandate. In this Part, I consider each of these
implications in turn.
A. Unintended Consequences of Shareholder Empowerment
Academic commentators concerned with the classic agency costs in public companies
have increasingly argued that such problems can be addressed by mandating that shareholders
vote on a range of subjects.85 In particular, the prospect of providing shareholders with
nonbinding votes—for which the cost to a shareholder (and management) of a controversial vote
may be lower—reflecting their preferences on myriad matters has become an attractive
alternative for federal policymakers.
To take just one example, the House of Representatives recently passed a bill that would
require every U.S. public company to give shareholders an advisory vote on corporate spending
on politics.86 That proposal follows the law of the United Kingdom, which has mandated such

The long literature on providing shareholders with this voice grew substantially after Delaware’s
determination to give corporate directors veto rights in the market for corporate control became clear. For seminal
work on the limits of shareholder voting more generally, compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: An
Informal Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991) with, e.g.,
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
85

86

See, e.g., For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (March 8, 2019), Section 4502 (purporting to
prohibit any publicly traded company from engaging in corporate political spending unless the issuer follows
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votes for over a decade,87 and academic arguments that such votes would address agency
problems related to such spending.88 Similarly, proposals to require public companies to give
shareholders a vote on matters related to environmental or social questions continue to gain
ground.
I take no position in this Article, of course, with respect to the desirability of such
mandates.89 But policy and academic debates on these subjects have not included a meaningful
discussion of the possibility that, given the restrictions placed by securities law on
communication among investors and the increasing reliance on activist hedge funds to enforce
corporate governance norms, mandatory shareholder votes will be used by hedge fund activists
as a sign of investor sentiment. Indeed, the SEC’s final rules mandating the say-on-pay votes
studied here—including more than 150 pages of analysis—make no mention of that possibility.90
In light of the evidence presented in this Article, commentators and lawmakers
advocating for mandatory shareholder votes would do well to consider the role of such votes in
providing signs of shareholder sentiment in a securities-law context that limits such
communication. It may be, of course, that in light of that context, providing investors with an

“procedures to assess the preferences of the shareholders of the issuer with respect to” such spending); see also
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010) (same).
87
See Companies Act 2006, c. 7, § 366 (U.K.) (requiring shareholder authorization for corporations to
make political donations).
88

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 98 (2010); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Democracy from Say on Pay to Say on
Politics, 30 CONST. COMMEN. 431 (2015) (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandated offers a legislative
precedent for say-on-politics).
89

Many who support such mandates might rejoice in the results identified here, viewing enhanced
shareholder influence—including through activist hedge funds—as strictly desirable. For present purposes, I put
those arguments to one side, instead arguing only that a complete analysis of such policies should include the
possibility that the votes they produce will provide activist investors with signs of shareholder sentiment.
90

SEC, Final Rule: Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, supra note 37.
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alternative means of communication is viewed as an additional benefit. But neither DoddFrank’s say-on-pay mandate, nor the other voting mandates now being considered by Congress,
have been justified on that basis. Policymakers should consider these implications before
adopting such mandates.
B. Securities Law Governing Activist Investors
Commentators and policymakers are now engaged in a lengthy debate on the federal law
governing activist investors. In particular, since 1968 the Williams Act has required investors
who acquire stakes of more than 5% in public companies to disclose, within 10 days, their
position and any plans they have to pursue control of the firm.91 The Dodd-Frank Act gave the
SEC authority to shorten the ten-day window.92 And a leading law firm has petitioned the
Commission to reduce the ten-day period to one day, requiring activists who acquire more than
5% of a public company to disclose that fact within 24 hours.93
The Commission has shown interest in pursuing this change,94 particularly in light of the
contention that the Williams Act’s regime was designed for a rather different technological
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Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968); see also SEC, Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1)

(2018).
92

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) § 929R (amending the Williams Act’s ten-day disclosure rule to ten days “or within such shorter time as the
Commission may establish by rule”).
93

Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (March 7, 2011), at 2 (“There is no valid policy-based or pragmatic reason that purchasers of significant
ownership stakes in public companies should be permitted to hide their actions from other shareholders.”).
94

See, e.g., SEC, Beneficial Ownership Requirements and Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-64628, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,579, 34,581 (2011); Ronald Oral, SEC Eyes Faster Disclosure for Activist Funds,
CBSMARKETWATCH (2011) (“[T]he chief of the SEC’s Office of Mergers and Acquisitions[ has] said that she plans
to recommend [that the SEC should] shorten the number of days activists investors have before they must publicly
disclose they have a 5% stake in the company.”).

33

period in capital markets.95 In response, academic commentators have come forward to note that
other legal changes since the Williams Act’s adoption have been unfavorable to activist
investors. In particular, these observers note, Delaware law now permits incumbent directors to
use antitakeover measures such as the poison pill to thwart activist interventions.96
The broader debate over whether activist investors generate long-term value in modern
capital markets—which in turn weighs on the optimal disclosure regime for such investors—is
beyond the scope of this Article.97 But consideration of that subject should include a complete
accounting of legal changes that have affected the costs and benefits of waging an activist
campaign. As this Article explains, in a securities-law landscape that imposes substantial costs
on investor communication, Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay mandate provides a mechanism allowing
activist investors to better understand firm-specific investor sentiment. Future debates about
proposed changes to federal law governing activism should take account of that mechanism
when evaluating such proposals.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal securities law has long been understood to impede communication among publiccompany investors. At the same time, activist investors who seek to hold corporate insiders
accountable need support from other institutional investors in order to effect change. In a world
See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 93, at 3 (“The pragmatic reasons which may
have motivated the inclusion of a ten-day reporting lag in the Williams Act are simply obsolete. Changes in
technology, acquisition mechanics, and trading practices have given investors the ability to make these types of
reports with very little preparation time.”).
95

See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 43, at 57 n.59 (“[S]tate law now allows companies to use
poison pills selectively to disfavor some outside [investors] and to prohibit some shareholders—but not others—
from holding stakes exceeding a specified threshold.” (citing Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, LP v. Riggio, 1 A.3d
310 (Del. Ch. 2010)); but see Kahan & Rock, supra note 48, at 965 (expressing skepticism about the legal validity
of such measures).
96

97

Compare, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 24 with Coffee & Palia, supra note 24; see also Martin Lipton,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV.
(2013).
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with few avenues for communication, mandates requiring investors to vote on particular subjects
offer a plausible mechanism through which activists might assess shareholder sentiment. Yet the
extensive academic, legislative, and regulatory analysis that produced Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay
mandate, and proposals like it, gave little consideration to the implications of those mandates for
shareholder communication.
In this Article, I offer evidence that the say-on-pay mandate does indeed provide activists
with important signs of investors’ openness to an intervention. Exploiting the unique setting
introduced by Dodd-Frank, the Article provides plausible causal evidence that the mere
occurrence of a say-on-pay vote increases the likelihood of an activist intervention in the
subsequent year. The Article also shows the cross-sectional predictive power of the results of
those votes, and provides suggestive evidence that the say-on-pay voting regime established by
Dodd-Frank facilitates activist success. Intended or not, this consequence has important
implications for contemporary corporate governance.
Finally, the Article describes implications of these findings for professors, practitioners,
and policymakers. Those now advancing further federal shareholder-voting mandates as a means
of empowering public-company investors should consider the investor communication
consequences of such mandates when analyzing the desirability of those policies. Ongoing
debates about the securities law governing activism should take account of the effects of DoddFrank’s say-on-pay mandate on activists’ work. And future analysis of shareholder voting as a
solution to agency problems should consider the broader legal context in which such votes occur.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I first provide further detail on the data used to produce the results
described in this Article. Then, I describe the results of additional empirical tests I have
conducted to further explore the findings in the Article.
A. Data
I begin by drawing data on the outcomes of shareholder votes from Institutional
Shareholder Services Voting Analytics.98 I then compute the outcomes of each firm’s say-on-pay
votes—that is, the proportion voting For, Against, and Abstain.
In order to control for the wide range of factors on which activism depends, I compute
covariates identified in the literature as predictive of activism.99 I begin by downloading
accounting-level data for all publicly traded firms from Compustat, complementing the firmlevel data with CRSP detail on stock prices, information on sell-side analysts who follow each
stock,100 and information on institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters, cleaning that dataset
using standard methods.101 Using these data, I compute quarterly covariates identified in the
literature as predictive of activism.
Specifically, I calculate Market value, MV, as the natural log of market capitalization.
Return on assets, ROA, is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged
assets. Institutional ownership, INST, is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional

98

See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES VOTING ANALYTICS DATABASE, supra note 53.

99

For a summary of the literature identifying these variables, see, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 58.

100

WHARTON RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, COMPUSTAT AND CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SECURITY PRICES
DATASETS, supra note 58.
101

This process involves adding holdings data for a number of asset managers known to be omitted from
the Thomson Reuters database, aggregating holdings at the fund-family level, addressing missing data, and adjusting
certain datapoints for errors, particularly with respect to shares outstanding. See Azar et al., supra note 21
(replication code available from the Journal of Finance).
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investors. Passive ownership, PASSIVE, is the percentage of passive ownership in a firm.
Leverage, LEV, is debt divided by the sum of debt and book value of equity. Dividend yield,
DIVYLD, is the sum of the common dividend and the preferred dividend divided by the sum of
the market value of common stock and the book value of the preferred. Research and
development, RND, is the research and development cost divided by lagged assets. Analyst is the
number of analysts covering a firm at year-end. Q is the sum of the book value of debt and the
market value of equity divided by the sum of the book value of debt plus the book value of
equity. Sales growth, GROWTH, is year-over-year quarterly sales growth. The Amihud
illiquidity measure, AMIHUD, is the daily average over the quarter of the ratio of absolute stock
return to dollar volume. I then winsorize these covariates at the 1% level to mitigate the effects
of outliers.
Finally, I use the SharkRepellent database to draw my dependent variables.102
Specifically, I draw variables specifying the announcement of an activist campaign and the
results of that campaign from SharkRepellent.
B. Analysis
In this section, I present additional empirical tests further exploring the findings in the
Article. I first provide details on the propensity score matching process used in Section III.C.1 to
show that firms holding the say-on-pay vote only once every two or three years are more likely
to be the target of activism in the year following a say-on-pay vote. Next, I show provide
additional tests showing that the results of the say-on-pay votes cross-sectionally predict future
activism, in accordance with the findings in Section III.C.2. Finally, I provide suggestive
evidence that activists have learned over time to rely on the outcomes of the say-on-pay vote in
identifying firms to target.
102

See SHARKREPELLENT.NET, supra note 57.
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1. Say-on-Pay Votes and Activism. In Section III.C.1 of the Article, I provide evidence
that firms holding the say-on-pay vote only once every two or three years are more likely to be
the target of activism in the year following a say-on-pay vote. To ensure that the treatment and
control groups—that is, voting and non-voting years—in that analysis are truly comparable, I
perform propensity score matching. In order to match on key characteristics, I match firmquarters by size (as proxied for by the natural log of market capitalization), performance (as
proxied for by return on assets), and industry, within three-year periods throughout the sample.
I begin by providing results of a covariate balance test, which shows that the sample is
balanced between voting years and non-voting years. Table A1 describes the results of that test:
Mean
Voting
Non-Voting %bias
t-statistic
Market Capitalization
5.3369
5.3667
-1.5
-1.16
ROA
-0.0312
-0.0300
-0.8
-0.68
TABLE A1. PROPENSITY MATCHING BALANCE TEST103

p-value
0.246
0.494

As Table A1 shows, there are no statistically significantly different means among the
groups. This provides some comfort that the voting and non-voting years being compared in the
matched sample are well-balanced on the key characteristics of size and performance.
Second, I consider the density of the propensity score. Figure A1 below plots that density
for both the treatment and control groups:

103

I report t-statistics and p-values for simplicity of presentation and interpretation. In unreported analysis,
I separately consider normalized differences. See, e.g., Guido W. Imbens, Matching Methods in Practice: Three
Examples, 50 J. HUM. RESOURCES 2 (2015).
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FIGURE A1. KERNEL DENSITY PLOT

As we see from Figure A1, the propensity scores appear nearly identical for both groups.
This offers additional confidence that the matching process produced balanced groups.
2. Vote Outcomes and Activism. Section III.C.2 of the Article offers evidence that the
outcomes of say-on-pay votes predict future activism. In this section, I provide additional tests
regarding that finding.
Table 5 shows the results of regressing the probability of activism in the subsequent year
against the proportion of votes Against say-on-pay. In the following table, I show those same
results but display coefficients for several additional covariates:104

104

While I run the regression with the full set of control variables described in Section A of the Appendix, I
only highlight important covariates for presentation purposes. Notwithstanding the limitations of Tobin’s Q in
particular, see Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 58, the results show that firms targeted by activists tend to be lowervalued firms, return less money to shareholders, have a higher institutional ownership base to whom activists may
argue their case, and are followed by a larger number of analysts, who serve as a channel to discover and
disseminate information on the firm to the market.
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Dummy for
Activist in
Next Year
(1)
0.2488***
(0.0299)

Dummy for
Activist in Next
Year
(2)
Proportion of Votes
0.2269***
Against on Say-on-Pay
(0.0344)
Q
-0.0020***
(0.0005)
Dividend Yield
-1.9380***
(0.9358)
Institutional Ownership
0.0662***
(0.0154)
Number of Analysts
0.0016**
(0.0006)
Controls?
No
Yes
Observations
20,486
16,134
TABLE A2. PREDICTIVE POWER OF SAY-ON-PAY VOTES ON FUTURE ACTIVISM

Table A2 offers further detail on the most meaningful covariates for purposes of
evaluating the results in Table 5. For completeness, and acknowledging the difficulties in
interpreting coefficient magnitudes in such models, I also present a probit model of those same
tests:105
Dummy for
Activist in
Next Year
(1)
1.3413***
(0.1316)

Dummy for
Activist in Next
Year
(2)
Proportion of Votes
1.1483***
Against on Say-on-Pay
(0.1463)
Q
-0.0145***
(0.0032)
Dividend Yield
-16.1886*
(9.5405)
Institutional Ownership
0.4422***
(0.0928)
Number of Analysts
0.0091**
(0.0036)
Controls?
No
Yes
Observations
20,486
16,134
TABLE A3. PROBIT MODEL OF PREDICTIVE POWER OF SAY-ON-PAY VOTES ON FUTURE ACTIVISM

As we see in Table A3, a probit model produces qualitatively similar results consistent
with activists using the outcomes of say-on-pay votes in selecting firms to target.
105

Probit regression coefficients correspond to the change in the z-score following a one unit change in the
independent variable, making interpretations of the coefficients in Table A3 particularly difficult. However, I
present these results for readers who prefer the application of a probit model in this context in light of the potential
limitations of linear probability models.
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3. Time Trends in Investor Communication. If activists do, indeed, interpret say-on-pay
votes as identifying firms with dissatisfied shareholders who might support a dissident view, one
might ask: How did activists know how to use say-on-pay in such a way in the first place? One
possibility is that activists have, over time, learned to interpret indications from this particular
channel through experience.
To test that possibility, I divide my sample into three distinct time periods and re-estimate
the linear probability model establishing the cross-sectional relationship between say-on-pay
votes and activism. Table A4 below documents the growing nature of that relationship over time:
Dummy for
Activist in
Next Year,
2011Q12013Q1
(1)
0.1414***
(0.0507)

Dummy for
Activist in
Next Year,
2013Q22015Q2
(2)
0.2722***
(0.0526)

Dummy for
Activist in
Next Year,
2015Q32017Q3
(3)
0.2784***
(0.0637)

Proportion of
Votes Against on
Say-on-Pay
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,702
6,622
4,810
TABLE A4. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AND HEDGE-FUND ACTIVISM OVER TIME

Table A4 offers suggestive evidence that, to the degree say-on-pay votes tell activists that
shareholders are open to an intervention, activists have learned to use that information over time.
While we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the later two periods are larger
than that in the first, the monotonic increase and relative leveling-off in the point estimates of the
correlation between Against votes and activism over time is consistent with the possibility that
activist investors have learned, over time, to rely on the outcomes of say-on-pay votes as an
indication of shareholder sentiment.
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